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Abstract—In this paper, for overcoming the drawbacks of the
prior approaches, such as low generality, high cost, and high over-
head, we propose a Low-Cost Anti-Copying (LCAC) 2D barcode
by exploiting the difference between the noise characteristics of
legal and illegal channels. An embedding strategy is proposed,
and for a variant of it, we also make the corresponding analysis.
For accurately evaluating the performance of our approach, a
theoretical model of the noise in an illegal channel is established
by using a generalized Gaussian distribution. By comparing with
the experimental results based on various printers, scanners, and
a mobile phone, it can be found that the sample histogram
and curve fitting of the theoretical model match well, so it
can be concluded that the theoretical model works well. For
evaluating the security of the proposed LCAC code, besides the
direct-copying (DC) attack, the improved version, which is the
synthesized-copying (SC) attack, is also considered in this paper.
Based on the theoretical model, we build a prediction function to
optimize the parameters of our approach. The parameters opti-
mization incorporates the covertness requirement, the robustness
requirement and a tradeoff between the production cost and the
cost of illegally-copying attacks together. The experimental results
show that the proposed LCAC code with two printers and two
scanners can detect the DC attack effectively and resist the SC
attack up to the access of 14 legal copies.
Index Terms—Two-dimensional barcodes, anti-copying, illegal
channel, theoretical modeling.
I. INTRODUCTION
Two-Dimensional (2D) barcodes are widely used in various
applications because of their advantages of simple and low
cost. In addition, one attractive feature in 2D barcodes is
capable of providing significantly higher information capacity
than that in 1D barcodes [1], [2]. A 2D barcode pattern named
Quick Response (QR) code has been popularly used in our
daily life. For example, a QR code can be employed as the in-
formation entrance of an advertisement, the information carrier
for a mobile payment transaction, and a product authentication
for tracking and anti-counterfeiting, etc.
Recently, the security of 2D barcodes has received extensive
attention due to the following three major security risks [3]–
[8]. First, various types of illegal information, e.g., Trojan
virus and phishing websites, are encoded in a normal 2D
barcode. It is challenging to detect illegal information before
the barcode is decoded [9]. Second, a 2D barcode can be
illegally tampered by a replacement attack that covers the
original barcode by an illegal one. Under such attacks, some
important information, e.g., the payee of a mobile payment
transaction, can be tampered and it results in may cause some
economic loss [10]. Third, a 2D barcode can be illegally
replicated to fake a unique identifier in a tracking system for
the anti-counterfeiting application.
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The first two security risks have been effectively overcome.
For example, for the first security risk, an anti-virus and anti-
phishing recognition mechanism was used before the receiver
of a 2D barcode executes the decoded information [11], while
for the second security risk, the digital signature algorithms
can be used to check the authenticity and integrity of the
contents in a 2D barcode [12]. However, the third security
risk (illegal copying) is more challenging as compared with
the other two risks, since a 2D barcode can be easily replicated
with an off-the-shelf photocopier. An illegal copying 2D
barcode not only leads to large economic and reputational loss
for the authorized manufacturer but also limits the application
of 2D barcodes as an anti-counterfeiting technique. Thus, this
paper focuses on the problem of illegal copying.
In the literature, some approaches have been proposed to
overcome the security risk of illegal copying but accompany-
ing with some limitations. Now, we briefly introduce them as
follow.
1) Special Printing Materials or Techniques. This approach
exploits the special features of printing materials or techniques,
which cannot be reproduced on purpose, to counter the attack
of illegal copying. For example, a polymerized liquid crystal
material [13] with unique optical characteristics can be used
to print an anti-copying 2D barcode. Some red, green and blue
light-emitting nano-particles [14] can be used to construct 3-
dimensional (3D) QR codes that cannot be copied by ordinary
technologies. Special halftone printing technology [15] can
generate 2D barcodes that are invisible under visible light.
However, this approach not only increases the production cost
but also reduces the universal applicability of a 2D barcode,
which hinders its promotion in extensive applications.
2) Physical Unclonable Function (PUF). The PUF is an
unclonable response function which inputs a stimulus to a
physical entity and then outputs a unique feature according
to the internal physical structure, e.g., a unique texture of
printing paper [16]. In recent years, researchers have found
that it is possible for a mobile imaging device under a
semi-controlled condition to acquire images of paper and to
extract microscopic textural features for constructing the PUF
[17]. The PUF, which acts as a digital signature of each
printing substrate, is stored in an online database to facilitate
the verification of textural features extracted from a query
document. This approach has a limitation. The authentication
is performed over an online database, where the scale of the
database has been greatly restricted. The scale of the database
applied is often not sufficiently large to have extensive uni-
versality. When the scale of the database is expanded, the
accuracy of its authentication will be reduced.
3) Anti-copying Pattern. Some patterns with detailed fea-
tures, such as high-density black or white blocks, can be
used to prevent illegal copying [18]. Similarly, the following
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2patterns also can be used for anti-copying, e.g., the black-
and-white texture pattern with a grating structure [19] and
color anti-copying pattern which contains the information of
four channels of CMYK [20]. This approach requires that the
legal receiver equips a capturing device with a high resolution,
which apparently increases the implementation cost of the
receiver and is impractical for a low-cost mobile phone.
4) Digital Watermarking. The digital watermarking tech-
nology (DWT) can embed certain privacy information in a 2D
barcode so as to protect its content authenticity [15]. Semi-
fragile watermark is an important branch of DWT [21], which
can resist distortion or tamper with low intensity and can detect
distortion or falsification of various types of images with high
intensity [22]. However, to our best knowledge, there is no
public report that a digital watermarking technique has been
used against illegally-copying attacks.
In summary, the existing anti-copying approaches have
the drawbacks of low generality for special material, high
cost for high-resolution equipment and high overhead for
online database required. In this paper, we focus on the
print-capture channel where a message is transmitted using a
printed medium and is retrieved by a mobile imaging device.
We propose a low-cost anti-copying (LCAC) 2D barcode by
exploiting the difference between the noise characteristics of
legal and illegal channels. At the same time, we propose
some possible transformations of the 2D barcode, and give
corresponding covertness and robustness analysis. For ac-
curately evaluating the performance of the proposed LCAC
code, a theoretical model of the noise in an illegal channel
is established by using a generalized Gaussian distribution.
At last, based on the theoretical model, we built a prediction
function to optimize the parameters of the proposed LCAC
2D barcode in order to increase the cost of copying attack
and achieve a better anti-copying effect.
The key contributions of this work can be summarized as
follows.
1) We propose a low-cost anti-copying (LCAC) 2D barcode
on the basis of the considered 2D barcode, which
exploits the difference between the legal and illegal
channels. In the proposed LCAC code, the sender of
a 2D barcode embeds an authentication message into a
source message to realize the anti-copying purpose. Two
embedding strategies are proposed and analyzed.
2) For accurately evaluating the performance of the pro-
posed LCAC code, a theoretical model of an illegal
channel based on various printers and scanners is es-
tablished by using a generalized Gaussian distribution.
By comparing with the actual experimental results, the
theoretical model works well.
3) For improving the security of the proposed LCAC
code, besides the direct-copying attack, an improved
version which is the synthesized-copying attack, is also
considered in this paper. Based on the aforementioned
theoretical model, we built a prediction function to
optimize the parameters of the proposed LCAC code.
The parameters optimization incorporates the covertness
requirement, the robustness requirement and a tradeoff
between the production cost and the cost of illegally-
copying attacks together. The experimental results show
that our approach has a good ability to prevent illegal
copying.
II. BACKGROUND OF CONSIDERED 2D BARCODE AND
SYSTEM MODEL
A. Background of Considered 2D Barcode
Without loss of generality, this paper considers M -order
multilevel 2D barcodes [12], where M is the modulation order
and M ≥ 2. The block diagram of the generic 2D barcode is
illustrated in Fig. 1, as shown at the top of the next page. As
shown in the sender of Fig. 1, sc,1 denotes a source message
with length Lc = Nk, where N is the number of blocks and k
is the length per block. The sc,1 is encoded via Reed-Solomon
(RS) codes to obtain the coder output sc,2. The output length
of RS codes per block is denoted as n and its error correction
capability is t = (n− k) /2. Thus, the length of sc,2 is Ls =
Nn.
Then, through a pulse amplitude modulation (PAM) with
order M [23], we obtain a modulated signal sm. The modulate
block transforms a bit stream into the corresponding gray-scale
values. The case of M = 2 is very popular in the practical
application of 2D barcodes; however, the cases of M ≥ 4 is
becoming a new research trend due to its high capacity [12].
Thus, this paper focuses on the case of M = 4. Following [24],
the constellation points x are set as x ∈ {40, 100, 160, 220},
that is, x1 = 40, x2 = 100, x3 = 160, x4 = 220. Note that
the ideas of this paper can be straightforwardly extended to
other cases, e.g., M = 2 and M = 8.
After inserting the header and training symbols into the
modulated signal sm, the original version of a 2D barcode, sd,
is generated. The total length of header and training symbols
is denoted as Lh and the final length of a 2D barcode is
denoted as Lt = Ls + Lh, where the value of Lt should be
an integer after taking a square root to keep the 2D barcode
a square structure. The header symbols have two functions:
first, it stores additional information, e.g., format and version
of a considered 2D barcode; second, its length is adjustable
to ensure that the value of Lt satisfies the length requirement
in a considered 2D barcode [24].
In Fig. 2, the white and grey modules represent the mod-
ulated symbols of information bits and redundant bits of
the source message, respectively. The yellow and red mod-
ules represent the locations of header symbols and training
symbols, respectively. The intensity of red illustrates the
gray level of the training symbols. Moreover, two types of
training symbols are considered. The first type is used to
estimate the spatial distortion, which is set over an entire
2D barcode as uniform as possible; the second type is used
to estimate the post-processing distortion, which is set at
the center area of a 2D barcode [24]. Following [24], the
gray value of the first type of training symbols is set to
130, while those of the second type of training symbols are
set to {30, 50, 70, 100, 160, 180, 200, 220}, as shown the red
cross of Fig. 2. Note that, as the last step of encoding a
2D barcode, a finder pattern should be attached to facilitate
the detection of a 2D barcode reader [25]; however, without
3Fig. 1. Block diagram of the considered 2D barcode.
(a) (b)
Fig. 2. Structure diagrams of LCAC codes, where the number of RS code
blocks is 2 (N = 2), yellow and red modules represent the header and training
symbols, respectively. The two diagrams are based on two different embedding
strategies: (a) Strategy 1; (b) Strategy 2. In Strategy 1, the authentication
message is randomly embedded into the redundant bits of the source message,
whereas, in Strategy 2, the authentication message is randomly embedded into
the entire bits of the source message.
Fig. 3. The system model of a 2D barcode with two possible channels, i.e.,
legal channel and illegal channel.
causing any confusion, the finder pattern is omitted in Fig. 1
for conciseness.
In Fig. 1, the first block of a receiver is the detection
block which scans the printed 2D barcode with a mobile
phone camera or an optical scanner. The detection block
is to locate and to segment the captured version of a 2D
barcode by using the finder pattern. Then, the detection block
quantizes the mean intensity within each partitioned area to
obtain a gray-scale signal sˆd. The sˆd is fed into an equalizer
block which compensates the channel distortion by using
the training symbols described above [24]. Specifically, the
equalizer block trains a fitting function to reflect the channel
distortion by comparing the gray-scale values of the scanned
training symbols with those of the considered ones. The fitting
function can be described by a sigmoid function in practical
situations [24]. When the fitting function is trained, an inverse
fitting function is further established to correct the distortions
in sˆd. Then, sˆm is extracted by removing the header and
training symbols in sˆd. Next, sˆm is demodulated and decoded
to obtain sˆc,2 and sˆc,1, respectively.
(a) (b) (c) (d) (e)
Fig. 4. Examples of a 2D barcode: (a) original 2D barcode; (b) captured
legal 2D barcode; (c) captured illegally copied 2D barcode; (d) enlarged top-
left region of a legal 2D barcode; (e) enlarged top-left region of an illegally
copied 2D barcode.
B. System Model
As shown in Fig. 3, we consider the system model of a 2D
barcode by two different channels, i.e., a legal channel and an
illegal channel. In the legal channel, as shown by the lower
branch of Fig. 3, a legal 2D barcode is received through only
a print-and-capture process, whereas in the illegal channel as
enclosed by the dashed box of Fig. 3, an illegal 2D barcode is
received through a print-scan-print-and-capture process, which
is denoted as a double print & scan (DPS) process. Intuitively,
the distortion and noise in an illegal channel are more serious
than those in a legal channel. Specifically, the total noise in a
legal channel can be modeled as
e1 = ep1 ⊕ ec, (1)
where ep1 and ec represent the noise components of the first
printing process and the legal detecting process, respectively,
′⊕′ represents the interaction of noise in different stages. The
more common relationships are additive noise and multiplica-
tive noise. The total noise in an illegal channel is written as
e2 = ep1 ⊕ es ⊕ ep2 ⊕ ec, (2)
where es and ep2 denote the noise components of the illegal
scanning process and the second printing process, respectively.
By considering the models of printing and scanning pro-
cesses in [24], it is easy to conclude that σ2e1 < σ
2
e2 since more
processes of printing or scanning introduce more noise. This
conclusion is also demonstrated through an example shown in
Fig. 4. By comparing the details of Fig. 4(a) with those of Fig.
4(b) and Fig. 4(c), the noise variance of the legal 2D barcode
is slightly larger than that of the original barcode, whereas the
noise variance of the illegally copied one is much larger than
those of both the legal 2D barcode and the original barcode.
Although it is possible to distinguish the illegally copied 2D
barcode by detecting various characteristics of two channels
[18], [26], it is challenging for a low-cost mobile terminal,
e.g., a mobile phone, to finish this task due to the following
two reasons. First, it is difficult to set an appropriate threshold
to distinguish two types of 2D barcodes, even for the enlarged
subgraph as shown in Fig. 4(d) and Fig. 4(e), since there is
no prior information for two types of channels. Second, if
4Fig. 5. Block diagram of the sender in the proposed LCAC code.
the mobile phone performs an authentication with the online
database, which not only causes large network overhead but
also introduces additional security risks due to the frequent
sensitive data exposure during wireless communication. The
basic idea of our approach is to embed an authentication
message into a source message, where the decoded bit-error-
rates (BER) of the authentication message is sensitive to the
noise variance. In the receiver, we set an appropriate threshold
for decoded BER of authentication message to detect whether
the received 2D barcode is an illegally copied version of the
legal 2D barcode or not, which will be described in the next
section. Then, we fine-tune the performance of our approach
by optimizing the embedding parameters of the authentication
message, which will be described in Section VI.
III. THE PROPOSED LOW-COST ANTI-COPYING CODE
A. Description for the Sender
As shown in Fig. 5, we generate an authentication message
sa,1 for anti-copying purpose. The sa,1 is encoded via the
Bose-Chaudhuri-Hocquenghem (BCH) codes to obtain the
coder output sa,2 for improving its robustness. The lengths
of sa,1 and sa,2 are denoted as ka and na respectively, and
the error correction capability is ta.
The key block of the sender in the proposed LCAC code
is the embed block which replaces certain bits of the source
message by those of the authentication message. Specifically,
if the bit of the source message is different from that of the
authentication message, this bit is modified from 0 to 1 or 1
to 0; otherwise, this bit is kept unchanged. Apparently, the
embedding operation sacrifices the robustness of the source
message, which also can be denoted as the covertness of
the authentication message. There are two aspects of the
covertness requirement in our LCAC code. First, the presence
of the authentication message should not be easily detectable
by the illegal receiver. Second, it should not have a noticeable
effect on the receivers’ ability to recover the source message.
Moreover, covert authentication in an LCAC code may be
used together with other security techniques in the conven-
tional approaches to produce a more secure 2D barcode. In
this paper, the covertness performance is analyzed through
the error probability of demodulation and decoding for the
source message. The values of ka and na, the parameters
of the proposed LCAC code, should be optimized by jointly
considering the covertness and robustness of authentication
message, which will be analyzed in Section VI.
Besides the embedding length na, The embedding locations
should be carefully designed as well. In this paper, we consider
two embedding strategies to define different embedding loca-
tions. In the first strategy, as shown in Fig. 2(a), which is short
as Strategy 1 for simplicity, sa,2 is randomly embedded into
the redundant bits of sc,2. In the second strategy, as shown
in Fig. 2(b), which is short as Strategy 2, sa,2 is randomly
embedded into the entire bits of sc,2. In the sender of an LCAC
code, the specific embedding locations are defined through
a one-way, collision-resistant hash function with the source
message and the secret key k, expressed as
ta = g (sc,1, k) , (3)
where the hash function g (·) is robust against input error
for generating the random locations. The secret key k is
generated and allocated by the sender. For higher security, k is
different for different source messages sc,1, which means that
different keys are generated for different products. Before each
verification attempt, the legal receiver sends an authentication
request to the sender, and the sender feedbacks k and sa,1 to
the receiver via a secure way, e.g., encryption. Note that we
can use some advanced key agreement protocols [27], [28] to
achieve the allocation of secret keys for further improving the
security of the considered 2D barcode.
Note that both k and sa,1 are only secret information
required in the LCAC codes and the exchange of secret
information occurs only once, thus the overhead for anti-
copying in the LCAC is very low. An alternative solution is to
allocate both k and sa,1 when the authentication program is
installed into a mobile phone, which avoids the exchange of
secret information. Note that, before a legal receiver accepts
a 2D barcode, the authentication message should be treated
as a noise signal as well since the legal receiver does not
know whether the authentication message exists or not in the
received signal.
For two embedding strategies, we have the following obser-
vations:
Observation 1: Strategy 1 has better covertness performance
than Strategy 2 since the impact of errors occurred in the
redundant bits to the decoding performance of source message
is smaller than that in the information bits according to the
coding structure of RS codes.
Observation 2: Strategy 2 has better robustness performance
than Strategy 1 since Strategy 2 has larger embedding range,
which spreads the authentication message into a larger area
and lowers the error probability caused by some local distor-
tion, e.g., a part of the 2D barcode is shaded.
Observation 3: Strategy 2 has better security performance
than Strategy 1 since each bit of the authentication message
is embedded in a larger space, which intuitively increases
the uncertainty of detecting the authentication message by
an adversary. The first two observations are verified through
experimental results in APPENDIX A.
The two embedding strategies in LCAC codes are illustrated
in Fig. 2 as two toy examples, where the case of N = 2
is considered. The blue modules represent the modulated
symbols of the authentication message. Note that, as the last
step of encoding a 2D barcode, a finder pattern should be
5Fig. 6. Block diagram of the receiver in the proposed LCAC code.
attached to facilitate the detection of a 2D barcode reader [25];
however, without causing any confusion, the finder pattern is
omitted in Fig. 2 for conciseness.
After the embed block, we obtain a signal with embedding
message se,2. Then, through a pulse amplitude modulation
(PAM) with order M [23] to yield a modulated signal sm.
After inserting the header and training symbols into the
modulated signal sm, the original version of a 2D barcode,
sd, is generated.
B. Description for the Receiver
When a printed 2D barcode is captured by a receiver, a
series of standard operations should be proceeded to extract
the source message. The block diagram of the receiver in
the proposed LCAC Code is illustrated in Fig. 6. Similar to
Fig. 1, the blue blocks represent the additional one for anti-
copying but the remaining blocks are the same as those of
considered 2D barcodes. The first block of a receiver is the
detection block which scans the printed 2D barcode with a
mobile phone camera or even optical scanner. Fig. 4(d) and
Fig. 4(e) illustrate the results of the detection block in a legal
2D barcode and an illegally copied 2D barcode, respectively.
Then, the detection block quantizes the mean intensity within
each partitioned area to obtain a gray-scale signal sˆd.
In the verification process, the receiver first generates the
estimated embedding locations tˆa using (3) with the secret
key k. And, the tˆa can be generated without error (tˆa = ta)
even when sˆc,1 contains some error since g (·) is robust against
input error, e.g., robust hash functions [29], [30]. According
to the location specified by tˆa, the receiver extracts sˆa,2 from
sˆc,2 through the extraction block and decodes it via a BCH
Decoder to obtain sˆa,1. By comparing the values of sˆa,1 and
sa,1, the receiver makes a final authentication decision. For
example, if the number of different bits between sˆa,1 and
sa,1 is beyond a predetermined threshold δ, the questioned
2D barcode is judged as an illegal one; otherwise, it is a
legal one. The specific value of threshold δ is determined
by exploiting the characteristics of the illegal channel. The
model analysis of illegal channel and parameter optimization
of the proposed LCAC code are presented in the following
two sections, Section IV, Section V, respectively.
IV. THEORETICAL MODELING OF AN ILLEGAL CHANNEL
This section describes the modeling process of an illegal
channel based on various printers and scanners. A typical
Print & Scan channel introduces several types of distortions,
e.g., intensity variation, scaling, rotation, low-pass filtering,
TABLE I
DESCRIPTION OF PRINTERS, SCANNERS AND A MOBILE PHONE
Name Model Resolution
Laser Printer 1 (P1) HP LaserJet P1108 1200 DPI
Laser Printer 2 (P2) FUJI P355D 600 DPI
CCD Scanner 1 (S1) BENQ K810 1200 DPI
CCD Scanner 2 (S2) EPSON V330 600 DPI
Mobile Phone (M) HONOR V20 48 MP
Fig. 7. Combinations of 2 printers, 2 scanners and 1 mobile phone to emulate
a DPS process.
aliasing, and noise. The single print & scan (SPS) process
has been modeled and analyzed [12]. In this work, a series of
experiments have been conducted to model an illegal channel
in a DPS process. The devices used and the corresponding pa-
rameters are listed in Tab. I, where two printers, two scanners,
and one mobile phone are chosen from various manufacturers.
Here, the remaining parameters of these devices are set as their
default values.
Without loss of generality, the source and authentication
messages are uniformly generated as two random sequences,
thus, the number of symbols in different constellations are
roughly equal. As illustrated in Fig. 7, a total of 16 combina-
tions is available to emulate a DPS process with 2 printers and
2 scanners in Tab. I plus one combination of P1−S1−P1−M.
Similar to the findings in [12], by observing the experi-
mental results, the intensity variation in the barcode over a
DPS channel can be modeled with a generalized Gaussian
distribution (GGD). For a GGD random variable (RV), i.e.,
X ∼ GGD (µ, σ2, γ) there are three parameters, including the
mean µ, the variance σ2, and the shape factor γ. According
to [31], the PDF and CDF of X can respectively be given as
fX (x) =
γη (σ, γ)
2Γ (1/γ)
exp
[− (η (σ, γ) |x− µ|)γ], (4)
and
FX(x) =
1
2
+ sgn(x− µ)κ
[
1/γ, (|x− µ| η(σ, γ))γ]
2Γ(1/γ)
, (5)
where η (σ, γ) = 1σ
√
Γ(3/γ)
Γ(1/γ) , κ (·) is the lower incomplete
gamma function, Γ (·) is the gamma function, and sgn (x)
represents a symbol decision function, i.e., sgn (x) = 1, if
x ≥ 0, and sgn (x) = −1 otherwise.
Now we introduce how to estimate three parameters of
a GGD distribution from experimental results. For a PAM
signal with order M , the transmitted signal is denoted by
xi, (i = 1, 2, . . . ,M), and the corresponding received signal
through a channel is denoted by yi (j), (j = 1, 2, . . . , J),
where J is the total number of experimental results on each
6constellation point. Following [32], the sample mean µi and
sample variance σ2i of yi (j) are obtained as
µi =
1
J
J∑
j=1
yi (j) , (6)
σ2i =
1
J-1
J∑
j=1
[
yi(j)− µi
]2
. (7)
The estimation of the shape factor γi is more difficult than
the other two parameters. According to the results of [33],
[34], we obtain generalized Gaussian ratio function r (γi)
which is a function of γi and is defined as
r (γi) =
σ2i(
1
J
J∑
j=1
|yi(j)− µi(j)|
)2 = Γ (1/γi) Γ (3/γi)Γ2 (2/γi) .
(8)
By setting r (γi) = ρi, a feasible solution of γi can be found
as
γi = r
−1 (ρi) , (9)
where an exhausted search approach is employed for solving
the (9) to obtain an estimate of γi. Then, the value of
γi gradually increases from zero and the search process is
completed until r (γi) = ρi. Although the GGD has been also
employed in [12] to model the channel of a 2D barcode, there
is a fundamental difference. It only considers the model of an
SPS process rather than a DPS process in an illegal copying
attack.
V. EXPERIMENT RESULTS
A. Experimental Results of Channel Modeling
In our experiment, the parameters of our approach are given
as follows: k = 440 bits, n = 2040 bits, t = 800, ka = 147
bits, na = 255 bits, ta = 14, N = 2, Ls = 4080 bits, Lh =
338 bits, and Lt = 4418 bits. Unless otherwise specified, our
experiments follow these settings. First, the printing material
is chosen as the A4 paper with weight 120g/m2 from the
Xerox. Second, an original 2D barcode with Lt = 47 × 47
modules is printed on the chosen paper, where the printed size
of each barcode is set as 3.2×3.2 cm2. Last but not least, each
combination is repeated 72 times to obtain the average results.
The general experimental settings are summarized as follows:
• Printing 1: HP LaserJet P1108 printer in 1200 DPI on
paper with 120 grams per square meter (gsm), and a
rendering size of 3.2× 3.2 cm2;
• Printing 2: FUJI P355D printer in 600 DPI on paper with
120 gsm, and a rendering size of 3.2× 3.2 cm2;
• Scanning 1: BENQ K810 scanner in 1200 DPI;
• Scanning 2: EPSON V330 scanner in 600 DPI;
• Camera Phone: HONOR V20 with 48 MP resolution;
• Barcode Design: A multilevel barcode with 47 × 47
modules;
• Capture Angle: Within 10 degrees between the barcode
image plane and the camera sensor plane;
• Capture Distance: About 15 cm in the in-focus case.
• Lighting: 300−350 lux for the bright case and 100−150
lux for the dim case.
Four metrics of bit error rates (BERs) can be calculated
to characterize the reception performance against channel
distortion. The first two metrics are used to measure the
robustness of the authentication message. The first metric is the
demodulated BER of the authentication message εa,2 which
is calculated by comparing sˆa,2 and sa,2, while the second
metric is the decoded BER of the authentication message, εa,1,
obtained by comparing sˆa,1 and sa,1. Moreover, the remaining
two metrics are used to represent the robustness of the source
message, which also represents the covertness of the proposed
LCAC code. The third metric is the demodulated BER of the
source message, εc,2 computed by comparing sˆc,2 and sc,2,
while the fourth metric is the decoded BER of the source
message, εc,1 by comparing sˆc,1 and sc,1, and determined by
the following formula: εc,1 = |εˆc,1 − εc,1|0/NK.
According to (6), (7) and (9), the estimation results of three
parameters of illegally copied 2D barcode under 16 combi-
nations are given in Tab. II. We accumulated the 72 samples
obtained from each combination, and the blocks corresponding
to the four gray values were superimposed respectively to
calculate the frequency of the actual gray values. Then the
corresponding histogram of the received signal constellations
in an illegally copied 2D barcode and GGD approximation
are shown in Fig. 8. We can see that the experimental results
match well with a GGD approximation for all constellations
except x1 = 40. It is conjectured that since the points of
x1 = 40 have the lowest intensity level as compared with the
other constellations, which is more sensitive to the distortions
in an illegal copying process [24].
Moreover, from Fig. 8, we can also obtain the following
observations. First, by comparing the results of the subfigures
in the first two rows of Fig. 8 with those in the last two rows,
we find that the sample mean of x4 = 220 in the former
group is larger than those in the latter group, which is due to
the different printers in the first printing process. Second, by
comparing the results of the subfigures in the first and the third
rows of Fig. 8 with those in the second and fourth rows, we
find that the peak value of histogram at x1 = 40 in the former
group is smaller than those in the latter group, i.e., about 0.05
and 0.15, which is determined by the chosen scanner in the
first scanning process; Finally, by comparing the results of the
subfigures in the first and third columns of Fig. 8 with those
in the second and fourth columns, we find that the peak value
of histogram at x1 = 40 in the former group is smaller than
those in the latter group, which is determined by the chosen
scanner in the second scanning process.
B. Advanced Illegal Copying Strategy
The experimental results given in the previous subsection
are based on a simple illegal copying strategy, i.e., direct-
copying (DC) attack. If an attacker can capture multiple
printed samples of the same legal 2D barcode, he or she can
utilize all samples to improve the probability of a successful
attack. For example, the attacker first generates a synthesized
2D barcode with better quality by averaging the intensities
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ESTIMATED PARAMETERS OF A GGD APPROXIMATION FOR ILLEGALLY COPIED 2D BARCODES UNDER 16 COMBINATIONS.
(a) P1 − S1 − P1 − S1
x µ (x) σ2 (x) γ (x)
40 38.63 138.53 1.34
100 119.87 432.05 1.77
160 169.03 333.62 1.93
220 215.83 120.37 1.76
(b) P1 − S1 − P1 − S2
x µ (x) σ2 (x) γ (x)
40 33.71 115.09 1.28
100 106.77 405.33 1.73
160 175.59 242.49 1.96
220 211.03 128.23 1.91
(c) P1 − S1 − P2 − S1
x µ (x) σ2 (x) γ (x)
40 30.99 156.18 1.22
100 110.31 351.84 1.75
160 171.46 217.05 1.98
220 210.87 112.96 1.99
(d) P1 − S1 − P2 − S2
x µ (x) σ2 (x) γ (x)
40 31.02 124.53 1.15
100 107.25 276.83 1.67
160 168.13 252.68 1.94
220 218.78 216.23 1.96
(e) P1 − S2 − P1 − S1
x µ (x) σ2 (x) γ (x)
40 24.83 34.01 0.84
100 100.54 385.77 1.83
160 160.95 267.73 1.95
220 202.44 132.34 1.81
(f) P1 − S2 − P1 − S2
x µ (x) σ2 (x) γ (x)
40 23.38 24.83 0.65
100 97.87 348.76 1.73
160 159.89 273.04 1.91
220 207.91 190.38 1.91
(g) P1 − S2 − P2 − S1
x µ (x) σ2 (x) γ (x)
40 31.48 29.65 0.94
100 105.64 429.72 2.35
160 161.22 221.04 2.11
220 203.75 103.07 1.72
(h) P1 − S2 − P2 − S2
x µ (x) σ2 (x) γ (x)
40 30.55 23.02 0.87
100 100.79 401.96 2.26
160 159.54 272.79 2.05
220 214.87 194.64 1.71
(i) P2 − S1 − P1 − S1
x µ (x) σ2 (x) γ (x)
40 24.91 85.63 1.22
100 114.92 323.97 2.16
160 165.03 226.41 1.98
220 198.55 124.51 1.99
(j) P2 − S1 − P1 − S2
x µ (x) σ2 (x) γ (x)
40 26.33 72.71 1.16
100 114.82 246.74 2.09
160 164.29 198.53 1.93
220 201.43 128.01 2.01
(k) P2 − S1 − P2 − S1
x µ (x) σ2 (x) γ (x)
40 29.21 110.79 1.38
100 111.27 238.01 2.07
160 166.02 158.36 1.99
220 188.91 76.36 1.86
(l) P2 − S1 − P2 − S2
x µ (x) σ2 (x) γ (x)
40 33.69 79.32 1.44
100 103.29 198.15 2.01
160 165.97 294.82 1.84
220 202.22 220.46 1.88
(m) P2 − S2 − P1 − S1
x µ (x) σ2 (x) γ (x)
40 25.41 31.56 0.96
100 111.59 217.18 1.88
160 160.26 172.17 1.92
220 198.09 124.09 2.02
(n) P2 − S2 − P1 − S2
x µ (x) σ2 (x) γ (x)
40 25.14 24.09 0.82
100 105.02 177.93 1.82
160 156.64 212.76 1.89
220 209.84 276.31 1.91
(o) P2 − S2 − P2 − S1
x µ (x) σ2 (x) γ (x)
40 30.64 21.97 0.85
100 103.56 215.04 2.24
160 152.81 183.35 2.03
220 187.54 139.71 2.17
(p) P2 − S2 − P2 − S2
x µ (x) σ2 (x) γ (x)
40 22.11 22.59 0.64
100 108.63 260.99 2.18
160 163.53 208.76 1.99
220 196.91 139.13 2.19
Fig. 8. Histograms of the received intensities in an illegally copied 2D barcode and the approximation curves of GGD models under 16 combinations: (a)
P1 − S1 − P1 − S1; (b) P1 − S1 − P1 − S2; (c) P1 − S1 − P2 − S1; (d) P1 − S1 − P2 − S2; (e) P1 − S2 − P1 − S1; (f) P1 − S2 − P1 − S2; (g)
P1 − S2 − P2 − S1; (h) P1 − S2 − P2 − S2; (i) P2 − S1 − P1 − S1; (j) P2 − S1 − P1 − S2; (k) P2 − S1 − P2 − S1; (l) P2 − S1 − P2 − S2; (m)
P2 − S2 − P1 − S1; (n) P2 − S2 − P1 − S2; (o) P2 − S2 − P2 − S1; (p) P2 − S2 − P2 − S2.
over all received barcode samples and then illegally prints it.
This strategy is termed as a synthesized-copying (SC) attack.
For convenience, the device combination of P1−S1−P1−S1
is chosen to emulate an SC attack. We still use a GGD to
model an SC attack, i.e.,
(GGD (µi (ns) , σ2i (ns) , γi (ns))),
where ns is the number of synthesized samples. Similar to the
8Fig. 9. Estimated parameters of an SC attack for an attacker’s receiver.
equations from (6) to (9), three parameters are obtained as
µi (ns) =
1
J
J∑
j=1
(
1
ns
ns∑
s=1
yi (s, j)
)
, (10)
σ2i (ns) =
1
J − 1
J∑
j=1
(( 1
ns
ns∑
s=1
yi(s, j)
)
− µi (ns)
)2
, (11)
γi (ns) = r
−1 (ρi (ns)) , (12)
where
ρi (ns) =
σ2i (ns)(
1
J−1
J∑
j=1
∣∣∣∣( 1ns ns∑
s=1
yi(s, j)
)
− µi(ns)
∣∣∣∣
)2 . (13)
Note that if ns = 1, an SC attack reduces to a DC attack.
1) Experimental Results at an Attack’s Receiver: The esti-
mated parameters of an SC attack with (10), (11) and (12)
are presented in Fig. 9. We can see that as ns increases,
the sample mean gradually closes the corresponding ideal
constellation point, and the sample variance decreases as
expected. However, the decrease rates of the variance become
slower gradually. For example, by comparing the case of
ns = 1 for x4 = 220 with that of ns = 2, the variance
is decreased from 28.20 to 24.48 and the decreasing ratio is
(28.20− 24.48) /28.20 = 13.19%. In contrast, by comparing
the case of ns = 7 for x4 = 220 with that of ns = 8,
the variance is only decreased from 17.94 to 17.84 and the
decreasing ratio is (17.94− 17.84) /17.94 = 0.56%. Thus, we
can draw an important conclusion of an SC attack: although
a synthesized operation can improve attack accuracy, this
improvement gradually approaches a bottleneck.
2) Experimental Results at a Legal Receiver: Through a
synthesized operation, an attacker generates 2D barcode and
prints it on a paper. Then, the legal receiver can scan it
and perform authentication to detect an illegal copying 2D
barcode. Now, we present the BERs analysis of an SC attack
for a legal receiver, where both scanner and mobile phone
are considered as the capturing device of a legal receiver, as
shown in Fig. 10 and Fig. 11, respectively. From Fig. 10 and
Fig. 10. BERs analysis of an SC attack for a legal receiver (Scanner).
Fig. 11. BERs analysis of an SC attack for a legal receiver (Mobile Phone).
Fig. 11, we can see that as ns increases, the values of all BERs
are decreased as expected. At the same time, the probability
that the BERs is equal to 0 also increases gradually with
the increase of ns. For example, as shown in Fig. 10, when
ns = 1, P (εc,1 = 0) = 0.0909 and P (εa,1 = 0) = 0.1250;
when ns = 8, P (εc,1 = 0) = 0.8871 and P (εa,1 = 0) =
0.7258. Here, P (·) denotes a probability measure. Moreover,
by compare the results of Fig. 11 with those of Fig. 10, we find
that the results under a mobile phone is better than those under
a scanner. For example, as shown in Fig. 11, when ns = 1,
P (εc,1 = 0) = 0.1102 and P (εa,1 = 0) = 0.1338; when
ns = 8, P (εc,1 = 0) = 0.8978 and P (εa,1 = 0) = 0.7790.
The advantage under a mobile phone is because the selected
mobile phone has better capturing resolution than that under
the selected scanner, which is further verified in the next
section by comparing the bias from the standard constellation
point to the recovered constellation point. Note that, since the
channel distortions in a DPS process are more severe than
those of an SPS process, the legal receiver cannot always
decode both the source and authentication messages without
errors.
3) Verification Decision in the Proposed LCAC code: Note
that the main objective of this paper is to find an effective
9and low-cost approach to authenticate an illegal copying 2D
barcode. Based on the experimental results of both Fig. 10
and Fig. 11, we consider two authentication approaches. In the
first approach, the authentication decision is made by checking
whether the source message can be ideally decoded, i.e., εc,1 =
0. In the second approach, the authentication decision is made
by checking whether the authentication message can be ideally
decoded, i.e., εa,1 = 0. Thus, the results of both P (εc,1 = 0)
and P (εa,1 = 0) are also provided in both Fig. 10 and Fig.
11.
Although the first authentication approach is simple even
no embedding of authentication message, it has two obvious
drawbacks. First, as ns increases, the value of P (εc,1 = 0)
is obviously increased, which lowers the efficiency of the
first approach. Second, the parameters of a source message
are predetermined according to certain considered of a 2D
barcode, and it cannot be arbitrarily changed for improving the
authentication accuracy. In contrary, the second authentication
approach is a better option, although the value of P (εa,1 = 0)
is also increased as ns increases. This is because the pa-
rameters of an authentication message are freely adjustable
to improve the authentication accuracy, which overcomes the
second drawback of the first authentication approach and
is the most attractive feature of the proposed LCAC code.
Therefore, we use the second authentication approach as the
authentication decision block of the receiver in the proposed
LCAC code, as shown in Fig. 6, which is specifically described
as the following definition.
Definition 1: The authentication decision block of the
receiver in the proposed LCAC code identifies the captured
2D barcode as an illegal copying one, if εa,1 > δ, where
0 ≤ δ < 1 is a threshold of the authentication decision.
Note that a smaller value of δ corresponds to higher security,
e.g., δ = 0 indicates that the captured 2D barcode is identified
as an illegal copying one if there is any decoded error.
However, a false rejection decision may accidentally occur,
since there is also a decoded error (εa,1 6= 0) for a legal 2D
barcode under some unideal situations, e.g., the resolution of a
capturing device is not sufficiently high or the lighting is poor.
Thus, the value of δ should not be set too small to avoid false
decision. On the contrary, the value of δ also should not be
set too large, otherwise, it will increase the success possibility
of illegally-copying attacks. In the next section, the criterion
for selecting δ will be discussed based on the chosen device
and the parameters of the proposed LCAC code can then be
optimized.
VI. OPTIMIZATION OF EMBEDDING PARAMETERS
In this section, we optimize the parameters of the proposed
LCAC 2D barcode in order to increase the cost of copying
attack and achieve a better anti-copying effect, which consists
of four steps. First, the experimental results of modeling for
an SC attack is presented. Second, based on the modeling
results, a prediction function is established. Third, based on
the prediction function, the parameters of the proposed LCAC
code will be optimized. Finally, the selection of δ is discussed
and experimental results are given.
A. Experimental Results of Modeling for an SC Attack
Although the modeling results of an SC attack given in the
previous subsection work well, it is mathematically intractable
to obtain an exact theoretical expression for the sum of
multiple GGD RVs. Thus, we propose a simple method to sim-
plify the process of establishing the prediction function. First,
following [35], we assume the sum of multiple GGD RVs can
be approximated by a new GGD RV, i.e., GGD(µˆf , σˆ2f , γˆf ).
Then the three parameters of the new GGD RV can be
estimated as follows. It should be noted that we have fitted all
three parameters of the curve, which is a process of correction.
According to the actual fluctuations of each parameter, we
used a variety of common curve fitting functions (Exponential,
Gaussian, Linear Fitting, Polynomial, Power with one term or
two terms and so on) for correction, and finally chose one of
them with the smallest error.
According to (10), (11) and (12), the estimates of three
parameters of a GGD approximation for an SC attack under 8
cases under a mobile phone are given in Tab. III. Then the cor-
responding normalized histogram of the received signal points
in an illegally copied 2D barcode and GGD approximation for
an SC attack are given in Fig. 12. Similar to Fig. 8, Fig. 12
shows that the experimental results match well with a GGD
approximation for all constellation points except x1 = 40.
As ns increases, we obtain two conclusions. First, the sample
mean of all received signal points gradually close the ideal
constellation point. Second, the sample variance of all received
signal points gradually decreases except that x4 = 220, which
indicates the complexity of a DPS process and the model is
more accurate in the mid-range region of the histogram.
B. Prediction Function
In the previous section, through experimental results, we
find that as ns increases, the success possibility of an SC
attack is increased. It is desirable to optimize the parameters
of the proposed LCAC code (ka, na and δ) to lower the
success possibility of an SC attack. In other words, the attacker
has to increase the value of ns to satisfy the condition of
authentication decision, i.e., εa,1 > δ. The attacker is required
to obtain more numbers of legal 2D barcodes from the man-
ufacturer, which significantly increases the cost of illegally-
copying attacks. If the manufacturer can predict the value of
ns, the used times of a 2D barcode can be determined to make
a tradeoff between the costs of production and illegal copying.
Specifically, a larger ns corresponds to a lower production
cost but increase the cost of illegally-copying attacks and vice
versa. An extreme case is that if the 2D barcode generated by
the merchant is unique, then his production cost is very high,
and the return is that the attacker cannot generate an illegal
2D barcode through synthetic attacks. So we need to make a
trade-off to estimate a reasonable ns.
It is tedious and difficult to predict the value of ns by
modeling an SC attack based on various experiments and
all numbers of synthesized samples. It is even impossible
under certain situation, e.g., the device used by an attacker is
unknown to the manufacturer. Thus, this paper considers a fea-
sible solution to predict the value of ns. Specifically, we first
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TABLE III
ESTIMATED PARAMETERS OF A GGD APPROXIMATION FOR AN SC ATTACK UNDER 8 CASES (MOBILE PHONE).
(a) ns = 1
x µ (x) σ2 (x) γ (x)
40 41.06 119.24 1.39
100 117.61 474.53 1.91
160 167.05 378.64 2.18
220 214.92 129.37 1.76
(b) ns = 2
x µ (x) σ2 (x) γ (x)
40 40.45 94.92 1.39
100 116.55 470.69 1.72
160 171.53 348.23 2.04
220 218.60 113.73 1.79
(c) ns = 3
x µ (x) σ2 (x) γ (x)
40 40.66 92.70 1.33
100 116.17 431.69 1.79
160 165.71 345.62 1.98
220 212.48 126.68 1.81
(d) ns = 4
x µ (x) σ2 (x) γ (x)
40 38.77 78.34 1.33
100 112.63 418.92 1.87
160 163.50 325.93 1.78
220 212.21 121.21 1.72
(e) ns = 5
x µ (x) σ2 (x) γ (x)
40 39.76 71.82 1.44
100 111.42 414.32 1.65
160 163.70 315.48 1.92
220 212.41 106.46 1.81
(f) ns = 6
x µ (x) σ2 (x) γ (x)
40 39.94 73.17 1.41
100 111.09 412.73 1.66
160 163.81 307.67 1.94
220 212.76 97.87 1.71
(g) ns = 7
x µ (x) σ2 (x) γ (x)
40 39.14 79.49 1.42
100 111.14 400.48 1.64
160 164.69 292.47 1.95
220 214.03 93.28 1.72
(h) ns = 8
x µ (x) σ2 (x) γ (x)
40 38.25 71.40 1.26
100 110.30 393.58 1.61
160 164.88 282.19 1.83
220 213.33 87.11 1.63
Fig. 12. Histograms of the received intensities in an illegally copied 2D barcode and the approximation curves of GGD models for an SC attack under 8
cases: (a) ns = 1; (b) ns = 2; (c) ns = 3; (d) ns = 4; (e) ns = 5; (f) ns = 6; (g) ns = 7; (h) ns = 8 (Mobile Phone).
establish a prediction function based on the modeling results
of an SC attack with a finite number of synthesized samples.
Then, based on the prediction function, the manufacturer can
effectively estimate the value of ns.
First, we use a power fitting function with two variables to
estimate µˆf as
µˆf = aµf
bµ , (14)
where f represents the estimated number of synthesized
samples, two variables (aµ and bµ) are obtained according
to µi (ns) = aµn
bµ
s .
Second, we use a power fitting function with three variables
to estimate σˆ2f as
σˆ2f = aσf
bσ + cσ, (15)
where three variables (aσ , bσ , and cσ) are obtained according
to σ2i (ns) = aσn
bσ
s + cσ .
Third, since from Tab. III., we can see that the value of the
shape factor fluctuates around a certain constant, we directly
use an average fitting function to estimate γˆf as
γˆf =
1
ns
ns∑
s=1
γ (s). (16)
Based on the results of Tab. III, prediction functions under
a mobile phone are devised. For the mobile phone M, the
estimated parameters and predicted parameters for x2 = 100
are illustrated in Fig. 13, where aµ = 118.6, bµ = −0.0342,
aσ = −138.5, bσ = 0.232, and cσ = 617.7. From Fig. 13,
we can see that the estimated parameters oscillate around
the predicted parameters, which verifies the efficacy of the
prediction function.
C. Parameter Optimization
Based on a prediction function GGD(µˆf , σˆ2f , γˆf ), we can
predict εˆa,2 and even εˆa,1. Due to the space limitation, we
briefly introduce how to obtain εˆa,2. First, the BER of certain
constellation point xi can be calculated as
εˆi =
M−1∑
j=0,j+16=i
αj
(
Fi (θj+1)− Fi (θj)
)
, (17)
where θj represents decision threshold, e.g., the case of M =
4, θ0 = 0, θ1 = 70, θ2 = 130, θ3 = 190, and θ4 = 255, αj
is a correction factor, e.g., the case of M = 4, αj = 12 for|j + 1− i| ≤ 2; otherwise αj = 1, Fi (θ) represents a CDF
based on the predicted parameters, expressed as
FX(xi) =
1
2
+sgn(xi−µˆf )
κ
[
1/γˆf , (|xi − µˆf | η(σˆf , γˆf ))γˆf
]
2Γ(1/γˆf )
.
(18)
Then the theoretical expressions of εˆa,2 is given as
εˆa,2 =
1
M
M∑
i=1
εˆi. (19)
Now we introduce a simple strategy of parameter optimization
(δ, ka and na) for the proposed LCAC code to increase the cost
of illegally-copying attacks. First, by considering the impact
of embedding operation on the source message, the value of
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Fig. 13. Comparisons between the three estimated parameters and predicted parameters for x2 = 100: (a) mean; (b) variance; (c) shape factor (Mobile
Phone).
na is determined to satisfy the covertness requirement of the
proposed LCAC code. Second, through some experimental
results under a practical condition, the value of δ is determined
to correctly decode the authentication message for satisfying
the robustness requirement of the proposed LCAC code. At
last, based on a prediction function, the value of ka is opti-
mized to achieve a tradeoff between the production cost and
the cost of illegally-copying attacks. In the next subsection,
the experimental results of the parameter optimization are
presented.
D. Experimental Results
In this subsection, we present the experimental results under
a mobile phone in both Fig. 14 and Fig. 15, where the other
parameters are the same as those of Tab. I. Fig. 14 shows the
instantaneous BER of authentication message for a legal 2D
barcode, while Fig. 15 shows the average BER of authentica-
tion message for an SC attack. The authentication threshold δ
is also illustrated in Fig. 14 for a comparison purpose. From
Fig. 14, we can see that some non-zero instantaneous εa,1
occurs occasionally although most of them are zero. Thus,
under the current conditions, we set the value of δ as the
maximum instantaneous εa,1, i.e., δ = 0.012 for satisfying
the robustness requirement of the proposed LCAC code.
Fig. 15 shows the average simulation results of εˆa,1 and
εˆa,2 based on a prediction function, and the theoretical results
of εˆa,2 defined in (19). From Fig. 15, we can see that the
average simulation results of εˆa,2 matches perfectly with the
corresponding theoretical results. As the estimated number of
synthesized samples increases, the values of both εˆa,1 and εˆa,2
gradually decrease as expected. Moreover, two cases of εˆa,1
(ka = 147 and ka = 179) are simultaneously illustrated in
Fig. 15, which indicates that the εˆa,1 can be controlled by
setting the value of ka. Based on this trend, the value of ka
can be determined by making εˆa,1 > δ, when the estimated
number of synthesized samples is beyond a certain value. A
Fig. 14. Experimental results: instantaneous BER of authentication message
for a legal 2D barcode in a combination of different printers and scanners,
including (a) P1−S1, (b) P1−S2, (c) P2−S1, and (d) P2−S2, respectively.
The x-axis represents different instances of experiments.
simple example is given as follows to verify the efficacy of
the parameter optimization.
Based on the experimental conditions of Fig. 14, a BER
comparison between before and after optimizations are given
in Tab. IV, where the threshold is set as δ = 0.012. From Tab.
IV, we can see that, before optimization, the average value
of εa,1 equals to 0.0113 for an SC attack with ns = 10, and
even P(εa,1 = 0) equals to 84.88%. After optimization, the
value of ka is increased from 147 to 179, which indicates
that the error correction capability of authentication message
ta is reduced from 14 to 10. Then, the average value of εa,1
is increased to 0.0340 for an SC attack with ns = 10, and
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TABLE IV
BER COMPARISON BETWEEN BEFORE AND AFTER OPTIMIZATIONS (MOBILE PHONE)
optimization Before After
Parameters ka = 147, ta = 14 and ns = 10 ka = 179, ta = 10 and ns = 10
Metrics εa,2 εa,1 P(εa,1 = 0) εa,2 εa,1 P(εa,1 = 0)
Performance 0.0342 0.0113 84.88% 0.0471 0.0340 44.71%
Parameters ka = 179, ta = 10 and ns = 14
Metrics N/A εa,2 εa,1 P(εa,1 = 0)
Performance 0.0378 0.0104 81.82%
Fig. 15. Average BERs of authentication message for an SC attack under a
mobile phone.
P(εa,1 = 0) obviously drops to 44.71%. While an attacker
should increase the number of synthesized samples to ns = 14,
the probability of attack success can be improved to a similar
level which happens before optimization. In other words, the
results predicted in Fig. 15, ns = 10 before the parameter
optimization can be successfully attacked whereas ns = 14
after the parameter optimization can be successfully attacked.
Thus, an attacker should increase the number of synthesized
samples to achieve the probability of attack success as a similar
level which happens before optimization, as shown in Fig.
15. After supplementing the experiment, we can find that the
prediction and optimization is still effective, that is, ns = 10
before the parameter optimization, εa,1 < δ , ns = 14 after
parameter optimization, εa,1 < δ.
VII. EXTENDED EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS AND
DISCUSSION
A. Comparison with Two-level QR Code
In literature, there are many existing approaches to achieve
anti-copying. We choose the latest one, which is called as
Two-Level QR (2LQR) code [5], to compare the performance
with our approach. To the best of our knowledge, the 2LQR
code is the best approach in the style of active embedding
for defending against illegally-copying attacks. The basic idea
of the 2LQR code is to replace all black modules of a
standard QR code with some black-and-white patterns which
are unknown to the third party and increases the pixel numbers
of each black module. In comparison with the 2LQR code, our
approach has the following advantages:
First, the 2LQR code introduces visually perceptual mod-
ification even if we do not put a 2D barcode with an em-
bedded authentication message and a 2D barcode without
that. However, our approach does not have this issue if we
do not put a 2D barcode with an embedded authentication
message and a 2D barcode without that at the same place.
Here, we justify this conclusion by comparing the mean
bias and variance of different gray values under both the
2LQR code and our approach, where the mobile phone M
is considered as the capturing device. Specifically, the mean
bias represents the distance from the standard constellation
point to the recovered constellation point. Smaller values of
the mean bias and the variance correspond to smaller visually
perceptual modification. We present the experimental results
in Tab. V, where we use the gray value “0” to represent the
results of the 2LQR code since the 2LQR code only modifies
the black part. Here, we choose two different and independent
patterns to replace the black modules in the 2LQR code. Tab.
V includes four cases:
1) Tab. V(a) represents the case that the experimental
results are obtained by a mobile phone, where we do
not embed the authentication message in the source
message;
2) Tab. V(b) represents the case that the experimental
results are obtained by a mobile phone, where we embed
the authentication message in the source message.
Note that, in Tab. V, the bold numbers in parenthesis rep-
resent the mean bias from the standard constellation point
to the recovered constellation point, which are obtained by
calculating the absolute values between standard values and
experimental values. From Tab. V, we can see that the 2LQR
code introduces larger both mean bias and variance than our
approach. By comparing the results of Tab. V(a) with those
of Tab. V(b), we can see that the 2LQR code introduces
significant difference for the mean and the variance due to
embedding the authentication message, whereas our approach
introduces a slight difference for both the mean and the vari-
ance. In summary, our approach has much better covertness
performance.
Second, the 2LQR code requires higher positioning accu-
racy of the capturing equipment or higher proportion of the
training sequence. This is because the 2LQR code requires
higher resolution to capture each sub-module whereas our
approach only requires the average intensity of each entire
module. Third, our approach provides a theoretical model for
illegal-copying 2D barcode, which is verified in Section IV.
Moreover, based on the theoretical model, we optimize the
parameters of our approach in order to increase the cost of
copying attacks and achieve a better anti-copying effect, which
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TABLE V
COMPARING THE MEAN AND VARIANCE OF OUR APPROACH WITH THOSE
OF THE 2LQR CODE, WHERE WE USE “0” TO REPRESENT THE RESULTS OF
THE 2LQR CODE AND THE BOLD NUMBERS IN PARENTHESIS REPRESENT
THE MEAN BIAS FROM THE STANDARD CONSTELLATION POINT TO THE
RECOVERED CONSTELLATION POINT.
(a) Without Embedded
Authentication Message
x µ (x) σ2 (x)
0 11.45 (11.45) 21.38
40 39.89 (0.11) 17.76
100 99.57 (0.43) 154.43
160 160.06 (0.06) 129.61
220 217.77 (2.23) 31.39
(b) With Embedded
Authentication Message
x µ (x) σ2 (x)
0 69.42 (69.42) 225.28
40 39.64 (0.36) 23.10
100 100.75 (0.75) 151.68
160 160.29 (0.29) 143.24
220 216.61 (3.39) 39.84
TABLE VI
DECODED BER OF OUR APPROACH IN A STANDARD QR CODE.
Mobile Phone Scanner
εa,1 (SPS) 0 0
εa,1 (DPS) 0.0064 0.0368
is verified in Section VI. However, the 2LQR code did not
provide the above features.
B. Experimental Results in Standard QR Codes
For a standard QR code, since there are only 0 and 255
gray values, it has larger tolerance level to noise as compared
with the case of M = 4. Thus, we should reduce the error-
correction capability of the authentication message. Specifi-
cally, we set na = 255 bits, ka = 247 bits, and ta = 1 in
standard QR codes. Tab. VI provides the experimental results
of our approach in a standard QR code under both Mobile
Phone and Scanner. From Tab. VI, we can draw the same
conclusions under the case of M = 4. In the SPS, all decoded
BERs are zeros whereas they obviously increase in the DPS,
which is also used to detect whether the received 2D barcode
is illegally copied or not.
C. Discussion
By analyzing the above experimental results, we can draw
the following conclusions: First, our approach does not destroy
the completion of 2D barcode, since the source message in the
SPS process can be successfully decoded by a legal receiver.
Second, by comparing with the experimental results based on
various printers, scanners, and mobile phone, it can be found
that the sample histogram and curve fitting of the theoretical
model match well, so it can be concluded that the theoretical
model works well. Third, based on the theoretical model,
we build a prediction function to optimize the parameters
of our approach. The parameters optimization incorporates
the covertness requirement, the robustness requirement and a
tradeoff between the production cost and the cost of illegally-
copying attacks together. The experimental results show that
the proposed LCAC code with two printers and two scanners
can detect the DC attack effectively and resist the SC attack
up to the access of 14 legal copies.
VIII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, the LCAC 2D barcode was proposed, which
exploited the difference between the noise characteristics of le-
gal and illegal channels. The proposed LCAC code effectively
overcomes the drawbacks of the conventional anti-copying
approaches. For accurately evaluating the performance of the
proposed LCAC code, we used a GGD to model a DPS
process in an illegal copying attack. By comparing with the
sample histogram and curve fitting of the theoretical model,
the theoretical model works well. For evaluating the security
of the proposed LCAC code, besides the DC attack, the
improved version which is the SC attack was also considered
in this paper. We built a prediction function to optimize
the parameters of the proposed LCAC code based on the
theoretical model. The parameters optimization incorporated
the covertness requirement, the robustness requirement and a
tradeoff between the production cost and the cost of illegally-
copying attacks together. The experimental results showed that
the proposed LCAC code is able to prevent illegal copying
effectively.
There are several promising future directions based on the
proposed LCAC 2D barcode. First, it is natural to extend the
gray-scale barcodes in this work to color barcodes. Although
the color barcodes are more complicated than the gray-scale
barcodes, both barcodes are quite similar and thus LCAC 2D
color barcodes are likely able to prevent illegally copying
effectively. Second, we research on detection techniques to
evaluate the security level of various anti-copying 2D bar-
codes. At last, we use some approaches of machine learning
or deep learning to improve the performance of the proposed
LCAC 2D barcode.
APPENDIX A
ANALYSIS OF THE TWO EMBEDDING STRATEGIES
We consider two scenarios in practical applications of 2D
barcodes: in the first scenario, there is no occlusion to emulate
an ideal situation, while in the second scenario, there is a
small occlusion over a 2D barcode to emulate a non-ideal
situation. Three examples of a small occlusion are considered
and the experimental results are given in Tab. VII. The size of
occlusion is defined as a×b, where a and b are the numbers of
row occlusion and column occlusion, respectively. Note that
the case of 0× 0 represents the first scenario, in which there
is no occlusion.
For the first scenario, we can see that all BERs are zeros
except εc,2. This is because the embedding of authentication
message sacrifices the robustness of the source message;
however, the error-correction capabilities of encoding modules
for both source and authentication messages are sufficiently
powerful and channel distortion is not introduced, we obtain
εc,1 = εa,2 = εa,1 = 0. Moreover, we observe that εc,2 in
Strategy 1 is smaller than that in Strategy 2, which reflects
that Strategy 1 has better covertness performance than that
of Strategy 2. It should be noted that this result verifies
Observation 1 given in Section III.
For the second scenario, we can see that a larger occlusion
size leads to higher BER values in all metrics. Moreover, two
additional conclusions are drawn here. First, since the values
of εc,1 and εc,2 in Strategy 1 are larger than those in Strategy 2,
which is consistent with the first scenario, Strategy 1 has better
performance in covertness than Strategy 2 and Observation 1
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TABLE VII
ROBUSTNESS ANALYSIS OF TWO EMBEDDING STRATEGIES.
Size (in modules) Strategy 1 Strategy 2
εc,2 εc,1 εa,2 εa,1 εc,2 εc,1 εa,2 εa,1
0× 0 0.0313 0 0 0 0.0314 0 0 0
2× 11 0.0519 0.0073 0.0230 0.0179 0.0521 0.0073 0.0211 0.0100
4× 11 0.0566 0.0074 0.0256 0.0185 0.0567 0.0079 0.0247 0.0104
7× 11 0.0724 0.0147 0.044 0.0339 0.0731 0.0161 0.0417 0.0224
is verified again. Second, since the values of εa,1 and εa,2
in Strategy 2 are smaller than those in Strategy 1, Strategy 2
has better robustness performance than that of Strategy 1 and
Observation 2 is verified.
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